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Patentanmeldung Nr.

Patent application No. Demande de brevet nº

02078328.8

## **PRIORITY** DOCUMENT

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Bezeichnung der Erfindung/Title of the invention/Titre de l'invention: (Falls die Bezeichnung der Erfindung nicht angegeben ist, siehe Beschreibung. If no title is shown please refer to the description. Si aucun titre n'est indiqué se referer à la description.)

Data retention of integrated circuit on information carrier

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Data retention of integrated circuit on information carrier

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The invention relates to an information carrier comprising an information area for storing information, and an integrated circuit comprising a storage unit for storing additional information. The invention also relates to a method for restoring the additional information. The invention also relates to an apparatus and to an integrated circuit.

An information carrier of the type described in the opening paragraph is known, inter alia, from patent application WO 02/17316 (= PH-NL010233). This patent application discloses an integrated circuit present on an information carrier comprising a light-sensitive sensor. Via this sensor the integrated circuit can be powered. Patent application WO 02/25582 (= PH-NL000525) discloses another information carrier of the type described in the opening paragraph. The integrated circuit present on this information carrier can be read out via capacitive coupling. The text of these two patent applications is hereby

Recently, it has been proposed to equip optical information carriers, like for example CD-ROM discs or DVD-Video discs, with an integrated circuit. The integrated circuit can be used for storing all kinds of information, for example information related to the actual content stored on the information carrier, but also access information. This access information can comprise keys for encrypting and decrypting the information stored or Digital Rights Management (DRM) information, i.e. information for controlling the type of access to the information, like read-only, copy-only-once, etc. Use of an integrated circuit on an information carrier appears to be a robust method of copy protection, because the information present in the integrated circuit is secret and cannot be easily accessed.

As the integrated circuit present on these information carriers have to be able to hold and/or store information, it comprises, besides means for receiving and transmitting information, a storage unit. This storage unit may be magnetically readable and/or programmable. An example of such a storage unit is a hard disc. This storage unit may also be electrically readable and/or programmable. Examples of this are non-volatile memories such as EEPROM, Flash, MRAM or FERAM. These memories are all multiple times

rewritable. Detailed information on these so-called non-volatile memories can be found in "Nonvolatile semiconductor memories, technologies, design, and applications", Chenming HU (ed.), 1991, ISBN 0-87942-269-6.

In general, most storage units suffer from data degradation and/or data loss. Associated with this is the term "data retention time". The data retention time is the time for which the reliability and/or correctness of data stored in the storage unit is guaranteed. For a non-volatile memory such as an EEPROM (an electrically erasable programmable read only memory that is inexpensive and needs no backup battery), the data retention time is specified for approximately 10 years. The data retention time for an EEPROM is not indefinite as, over time, charge tends to leak from the floating gates of some of the memory devices of the EEPROM. This leakage can, over time, lead to incorrect information or to a complete loss of information.

The inventors have realized that it is desirable to prevent this loss of information. If this information is degenerated or lost, it is possible that the information stored in the information carrier cannot be accessed anymore. This holds for example if the information is key information or DRM information. It is important to avert this, as it would lead to unjustly restricting the usage rights of the user or buyer of the information carrier concerned.

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It is an object of the invention to realize an information carrier comprising an integrated circuit, for which the loss of information stored in the integrated circuit, due to natural deterioration of the memory type used or due to any other cause, can be overcome. It is a further object to realize a method for restoring the additional information. It is a further object to realize an apparatus for performing the method. It is a further object to realize an integrated circuit for use in the information carrier.

According to the invention, the integrated circuit present on the information carrier further comprises a one time programmable memory comprising a resurrection key, the one time programmable memory having a substantially larger data retention time than the storage unit. By equipping the integrated circuit with a one time programmable memory having a substantially larger data retention time than the storage unit and by storing a resurrection key in this memory, it becomes possible to restore lost or deteriorated additional information, because the resurrection key can be used for recovering the additional information stored in the storage unit. The information carrier according to the invention thus

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has the advantage that the information stored remains useable, even after the time when the additional information stored in the storage unit is degenerated or lost.

The invention is based on the following recognition. Nowadays, most information carriers available are of such a high quality with regard to durability, that if such information carriers are equipped with storage units having a limited data retention time, it is not just imaginary that the information stored on such an information carrier "survives" this storage unit, i.e. the additional information present in the storage unit is lost or is degenerated before the value of the information stored on the information carrier is lost. The data retention time of a non-volatile memory like an EEPROM is specified for approximately 10 years. For an information carrier with an integrated circuit comprising such an EEPROM this implies that the integrity of the keys and the updateable rights stored in the EEPROM are not guaranteed after that time. The inventors have recognized that this effect is detrimental to the use of such information carriers.

In an advantageous embodiment of the information carrier according to the invention, the one time programmable memory further comprises information related to the expiration date of the information stored or to be stored in the information area. This has as an advantage that with this information it is possible to more accurately determine the way the additional information is lost or has been degenerated.

In a further advantageous embodiment of the information carrier according to the invention, the information carrier further comprises a disc key. Preferably, the resurrection key is encrypted with the disc key. Preferably, the expiration date is encrypted with the disc key. Using the disc key, the resurrection key and the expiration date can be protected against illegal access, as only compliant players are intended to be able to read out this key.

In a further advantageous embodiment of the information carrier according to the invention, the disc key is a unique disc key that is derived from an identifier of the integrated circuit. Preferable, the one time programmable memory further comprises the identifier. By deriving the disc key also from an identifier of the integrated circuit, for example a unique number stored in the integrated circuit, it is possible to strengthen the copy protection or information access system. The identifier can already be stored in the integrated circuit during production of the circuit, due to which changing of removing the identifier becomes almost impossible.

In a further advantageous embodiment of the information carrier according to the invention, the one time programmable memory is realized in fuse-logic. A fuse-logic one

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time programmable memory has as an advantage that it has an almost indefinite retention-

time. In a further advantageous embodiment of the information carrier according to the invention, the storage unit is an EEPROM having a data retention time of approximately 10 years. This information carrier according to the invention has as an advantage that the storage unit used on the integrated circuit present on the information carrier can be made thinner, as the thickness of the isolator layer in the storage unit, for example a silicon-oxide layer, can be decreased. Although this will increase the change that the electrons trapped in the floating gated of the EEPROM cell will flow away and will thus decrease the data retention time of the memory, the information lost can be restored using the resurrection key. This information carrier according to the invention thus has as a further advantage that storage units with a decreased retention time can be used. These kinds of storage units can generally be produced faster and cheaper than storage unit with a larger retention time. For example, the so-called Mifare Ultra Light EEPROM is produced by skipping certain steps in the IC process and by not performing extensive testing.

In a further advantageous embodiment of the information carrier according to the invention, the integrated circuit is contactlessly readable.

The invention further relates to a method for restoring the additional information stored in the storage unit present on the integrated circuit of the information carrier according to the invention. The invention further relates to an apparatus for performing the method according to the invention. The invention further relates to an integrated circuit for use in the information carrier according to the invention.

These and other aspects of the invention are apparent from and will be 25 elucidated with reference to the embodiments described hereinafter, and with reference to the

accompanying drawings, of which:

Fig. 1 shows diagrammatically an embodiment of the information carrier according to the invention,

Fig. 2 shows the use of the embodiment of the information carrier according to the invention as shown in Fig. 1,

Fig. 3 shows a first embodiment of the method for restoring the additional information present on the integrated circuit of the information carrier according to the invention,

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Fig. 4 shows a flowchart accompanying this first embodiment,

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Fig. 5 shows a second embodiment of the method for restoring the additional information present on the integrated circuit of the information carrier according to the invention.

Fig. 6 shows a third embodiment of the method for restoring the additional information present on the integrated circuit of the information carrier according to the invention.

Fig. 7 shows a fourth embodiment of the method for restoring the additional information present on the integrated circuit of the information carrier according to the invention.

Corresponding elements in the different Figures have identical reference numerals.

Figure 1 shows diagrammatically an embodiment of the information carrier according to the invention. An information carrier 1, for example a CD-Audio disc, has an information area 2 for storing information and an integrated circuit 3. It is schematically indicated that the integrated circuit 3 has a storage unit 4 for storing additional information, like for example an Asset Key  $(A_K)$  or Asset Keys  $(A_{K_0})$  and Rights information, and a one time programmable (OTP) memory 5.

An Asset Key is a key that is used for encrypting a certain asset with, for example a certain track of a CD-Audio disc. Each track of this disc can have its own Asset Key. However, an Asset Key can also be used for encrypting a number of tracks or for encrypting the complete contents of the disc. When these Asset Keys are used for controlling access to the information stored on an information carrier, they must be encrypted in order to prevent illegal access to the information. To this end they can be encrypted with a disc key (see Figures 3,4 and 5 and the accompanying description for an example of such a disc key).

Rights information is so-called Digital Rights Management (DRM) information, information related to the way the information stored in the information area, the actual data, is allowed to be used. This DRM information is known to the skilled person, and can for example indicated to the number of times the information may be copied or played back. This DRM information is updateable, for example when the information is copied one time, the DRM information indicating the number of times the information may be copied must be amended in that it is decreased by one.

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The storage unit circuit can for example be an EEPROM or flash EEPROM. An EEPROM is an electrically erasable programmable read only memory, which is erasable byte by byte, in contrast to a flash EEPROM, which is an EEPROM that cannot be erased by bytes but can be erased by the entire chip or large sections thereof. Detailed information on EEPROM and flash EEPROM can be found in the already mentioned "Nonvolatile semiconductor memories, technologies, design, and applications".

The memory arrays of these memories are constructed of a large plurality of floating-gate metal-oxide-silicon field effect transistor devices arranged as memory cells in typical row and column fashion with circuitry for accessing individual cells and placing the memory transistors of those cells in different memory conditions. Such memory transistors may be programmed by storing a charge on the floating gate. This charge remains when power is removed from the array. The charge level may be detected by interrogating the devices. EEPROM devices in memory arrays can store one (single-bit cell) or more (multi-bit cell) bits per device. Over time, charge tends to leak from the floating gates of some of the memory devices. This can result in an incorrect value. The change of this is even increased if a number of different charge levels are stored in one device as the differences between charge levels which indicate the different data values stored by the cell are much smaller when a number of levels are stored.

An OTP memory is a memory with a large retention time, at least large compared to the retention time of the storage unit also present on the integrated circuit. In an OTP memory data can only be stored once. OTPs can for example be EPROMs without the UV transparent windows in the packages, which can than also be called PROMs. Detailed information on OTP memories can be found in "A new programmable cell utilizing insulator breakdown", Sato, Nawata, Wada, IEDM Tech. Dig., pp. 639-643, 1985 (Paper 2.7 of "Nonvolatile semiconductor memories, technologies, design, and applications"). Also a fuse-logic OTP memory can be used. Programming such a memory required the removal of significant amounts of materials by evaporation.

In this OTP memory 5 a Unique Chip Identifier (IDuc), a resurrection key  $R_{\rm K}$  and the expiration date  $D_{\rm EXP}$  of the information stored or to be stored in the information area 2 is stored. A Unique Chip Identifier is an unique number associated with the integrated circuit present on the information carrier, which can normally not be amended or deleted and can be used for identification purposes, but can also be used in copy protection or access protection schemes. This Unique Chip Identifier can be stored "in the clear" and is than accessible without the knowledge of encryption keys or the like.

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As said before, this resurrection key  $R_K$  is used to restore the lost or deteriorated additional information of the storage unit 4. In a preferred embodiment, the expiration date  $D_{E\!NP}$  is also used in the restoration of this additional information. The working of  $R_K$  and  $D_{E\!NP}$  will be elucidated in embodiments of the method according to the invention, which are described below.

In this embodiment of the information carrier according to the invention, the information stored in the information area 2 of the information carrier 1 is encrypted with Asset Key  $A_K$  stored in the storage unit 4 of the integrated circuit 3. It should be noted that the terms encryption and decryption of information are also understood to mean scrambling and descrambling. In fact, it is evident to those skilled in the art that there is no fundamental difference between scramling/descrambling and encrypting/decrypting information.

Figure 2 shows the use of the information carrier of Figure 1. In Figure 2 the information carrier 1 of Figure 1 is read out by a player 6. This player can be any kind of player for playing information carriers, like for example the well-known CD-Audio player or the DVD-Video player. The working and functioning of such players is known to the person skilled in the art. This player 6 is modified, compared to the known players, in that it comprises a security module 7, capable of reading out the information present in the storage unit 4 and the information present in the OTP memory 5.

Using the additional information,  $A_K / A_{Ks}$ , Rights, present in the storage unit 4, the data stored in the information area 2 of the information carrier 1 is protected against illegal use. The data,  $E_{AK}(DATA)$ , is encrypted with Asset Key  $A_K$ . The security module 7 reads out the Asset Key  $A_K$  from the storage unit on the integrated circuit and sends this key to the decryption module 8 in which the encrypted data  $E_{AK}(data)$  is decrypted to result data which can be further processed in or outside the player 6.

In the case the additional information can not be reliable read out by the security module 7, the  $R_K$  can be used for restoring this additional information. This can for example be accomplished by connecting to the Internet over a so-called Secure Authenticated Channel (SAC) 9. This can also be accomplished by connecting to a content provider. This can also be performed in a shop in which the additional information is restored using the  $R_K$ . In the case the integrated circuit is capable of producing sufficient processing power, additional security can be achieved by applying a so-called Secure Authenticated Channel (SAC) 10 between the integrated circuit 3 and the security module 7 in the player 6. This will be further explained with reference to Figure 6.

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Different embodiments of the use of the information carrier of Figure 1 as shown in Figure 2 will now be discussed and explained with reference to Figures 3 to 6. In every embodiment shown in these Figures, the resurrection key  $R_K$  is used for restoring the Asset Keys and the Rights via Internet, a content provider or any other possible trusted third party. This resurrection  $R_K$  can comprise a unique number which can be used by a Trusted Third Party (TTP) when reading out the additional information and/or checking the integrity of this additional information. It is also possible that the resurrection  $R_K$  comprises an encryption/decryption key, a certificate or any other information that can be used by the TTP.

Fig. 3 shows a first embodiment of the method for restoring the additional information present on the integrated circuit of the information carrier according to the invention. Figure 4 shows a flowchart accompanying this embodiment. In this embodiment the storage unit present on the integrated circuit 3 is a non-volatile memory, in particular an EEPROM 4. In this embodiment the additional information stored in the EEPROM has been lost and this information is restored via a provider.

The Asset Keys  $A_K$  and the Rights are encrypted by a disc key  $CID_key$ . The encrypted Asset Keys and Rights,  $E_{CID_key}(A_K, Rights)$ , are stored in the EEPROM 4. The  $CID_key$  is derived by hashing the Unique Chip Identifier  $ID_{UC}$  with a Hidden Channel Key  $HC_key$ . However, it is also possible that the  $CID_key$  is derived by decrypting the  $ID_{UC}$  (when  $ID_{UC}$  is encrypted with the  $HC_key$ ) with the  $HC_key$  or that the  $CID_key$  is derived by decrypting the  $HC_key$   $ID_{UC}$  (when  $HC_key$  is encrypted with the  $ID_{UC}$ ) with the  $ID_{UC}$ . In contrast to  $ID_{UC}$ , this Hidden Channel Key is not allowed to be present in the clear, but can only be read out by a compliant player 6. This Hidden Channel Key can for example be the Hidden Channel Key as described in WO02/15185 (= PH-NL000451). The Resurrection Key  $R_K$  is also encrypted with the  $CID_key$  and the thus encrypted Resurrection Key,  $E_{CID_key}(R_K)$ , is stored in OTP memory 5, preferably in fuse-logic. As mentioned before, this

type of memory has a much longer retention time compared to EEPROM.

Information stored or to be stored in the storage unit 4 and the OTP memory 5 can be transferred between the player 6 and the integrated circuit 3 in different ways. In this embodiment the data transfer from the security module in the player to the integrated circuit is done via an optical link (opt), for example comprising a LED/photodiode, and the data transfer from the integrated circuit to the security module in the player is done via a radio frequency link (rf), for example a radio transmitter/receiver combination. Information on these links can be found in WO 02/17316 (= PH-NL010233).

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In the security module 7 the content of the EEPROM 4 is analyzed. This will be explained with reference to Figure 4. First, the EEPROM data, the additional information is read from the EEPROM in step 11. In step 12, the security module 7 checks whether the EEPROM data,  $A_K$ , Rights, has been degenerated. If the EEPROM data has not been lost or degenerated, the information of the disc is read out by decrypting the  $E_{AK}$ (data) with the read out Asset Key  $A_K$ . in step 13. If the EEPROM data has been lost or degenerated, the security module 7 checks whether the EEPROM data,  $A_K$ , Rights, has been "naturally" degenerated, in step 14. There are different ways to check whether the data has been naturally degenerated. For example, it is possible to detect the number of errors in a certain block and calculate the error rate. If this number exceeds a certain predefined number, it can be decided that the degeneration has not been the result of natural degeneration. Patent application WO96/20443 describes different embodiment of performing such a check. It is also possible to check whether the number of errors in the data exceeds the error correction capacity of the data. It can be decided that if this is the case, the degeneration is not due to natural degeneration.

In a preferred embodiment of this natural degeneration check, the OTP memory also comprises information related to the expiration date  $D_{\rm EXP}$  of the information stored or to be stored in the information area. Using this expiration date, it is possible to perform a more accurate detection of the way of degeneration of the EEPROM data. It is important to distinguish between natural and non-natural degeneration, because non-natural degeneration can be the result of attempts to illegally get access to the information stored in the information area of the information carrier by trying to delete the EEPROM data. By checking specific tamper profiles the security module 7 can detect non-natural degeneration (fraud) and block access to the information forever.

In a preferred embodiment, the degeneration of the EEPROM data is detected in the integrated circuit 3 itself by checking the pattern of 'natural' data degeneration. This has as an advantage that information relating to the checking of the pattern a degeneration does not have to be outsourced to the security module 7 of the player 6. This will reduce the possibilities of "eavesdropping" of this information. Further, as the check is performed in the integrated circuit itself, it is hampered that external signals can influence this check. In to be able to perform this check in the integrated circuit, the integrated circuit must be able to produce sufficient processing power.

If it is detected in step 14 that the errors in the data or the loss of the data has been the result of natural degeneration, the resurrection key  $R_{\rm K}$  combined with the disc key CID key can be used to restore the keys and the rights for example via the Internet or via a

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provider of a trusted party ("shop") by using a SAC, step 15. In a preferred embodiment, the availability of  $A_K$  and the rights supplied by the content provider should be coupled to the expected EEPROM expiration date  $D_{EXF}$ . This has as an advantage that replay attacks are prevented. If it is detected in step 14 that the errors in the data or the loss of the data has not been the result of natural degeneration, decrypting of the information present on the disc is prevented, in step 16.

Figure 5 shows a second embodiment of the method for restoring the additional information present on the integrated circuit of the information carrier according to the invention. In this embodiment, the Rights are made ever lasting via the provider after the expiration date has passed, despite the condition of the EEPROM data. This embodiment is based on the understanding that the actuality or lifetime information stored in the information area of the information carrier is limited. As an example, a software release is substituted by new updates and certain music is not popular anymore after a certain time. The rights management architecture checks if the disc content has been expired. After expiration the copy protection mechanism is bypassed by getting everlasting, or amended rights from the provider. Passing the expiration date will trigger the connection to the provider via for example Internet. In a variant of this embodiment, the expiration date  $D_{\text{EXP}}$  of the information is stored in OTP memory in the integrated circuit. In stead of storing the expiration date, it is also possible to use the production date of the information carrier. A certain predefined time after the production date, the Rights can then be made everlasting or can be amended. It is also possible to use multiple dates, for enabling gradually amending the Rights, for example after the first date the Rights are amended to copy-one, and after the second date the Rights are amended to unlimited rights. It is also possible to use this expiration date(s) for restricting the use after a certain time, for example in the case of an information carrier comprising a demo of a certain software program.

Figure 6 shows a third embodiment of the method for restoring the additional information present on the integrated circuit of the information carrier according to the invention. This embodiment differs from the second embodiment in that the Rights are amended or made everlasting after the expiration date without the intervention of or connection to the provider. In the player 6, it is checked whether the disc content has been expired. This is performed by comparing the actual date D<sub>ACT</sub> with the expiration date D<sub>EXP</sub>. If the actual date D<sub>ACT</sub> is after the expiration date D<sub>EXP</sub>, the additional information is amended in that 'ever-lasting-rights' are stored into the storage unit 4. In order to increase the

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security, the comparison whether the actual date  $D_{ACT}$  is after the expiration date  $D_{EXP}$  can also be performed inside the security module 7.

Figure 7 shows a fourth embodiment of the method for restoring the additional information present on the integrated circuit of the information carrier according to the invention. This embodiment differs from the third embodiment in that the transfer of data between the integrated circuit 3 and the security module 7 of the player 6 takes places over a Secure Authenticated Channel (SAC) 10. Such a SAC can for example be based upon public key cryptography. By implementing a SAC between the security module 7 and the integrated circuit 3 possible attacks on the channel between the security module and the integrated circuit can be blocked. An additional feature of a SAC protocol is that illegally produced or cloned discs can be revoked in a thorough way. In the SAC protocol certificates can be distributed by a Trusted Third Party (TTP) that identifies uniquely every disc or groups of discs. The SAC protocol checks by means of the  $\mathrm{ID}_{\mathrm{UC}}$  whether the disc is illegal or not. As a result, all cloned discs and its original one(s) can be revoked. The revocation list ("blacklist") can be distributed via legal discs to the player/recorder module or through (super) distribution or whenever rights are attained. The EEPROM 4 can further comprise keys relevant to the set-up of the SAC. To be able to revoke a disc, the player 6 verifies whether the ID<sub>UC</sub> is present on the revocation list. The asset-keys and the rights will be communicated over the SAC the security module. In the same way as in the third embodiment, the player 6 checks whether the disc content has been expired by comparing the actual date DACT with the expiration date  $D_{\text{EXP}}$ . If the actual date  $D_{\text{ACT}}$  is after the expiration date  $D_{\text{EXP}}$ , the additional information is amended in that 'ever-lasting-rights' are stored into the storage unit 4.

The invention claimed is not limited to a particular kind of information carrier comprising an integrated circuit. All kinds of information carriers can be used, like, for example, a CD-ROM disc, a DVD-Video disc, a DVD+RW disc a Blu-Ray disc, or a Mini Disc, but also non-optical information carriers, like, for example, a hard disc or a magnetical tape. The invention is also not limited to a particular kind of connection method between the integrated circuit and the security module present in the player (or recorder). Although in the embodiments an optical/radio frequency connection method is used (in which an optical connection is used for communication from the security module in the player to the integrated circuit, and in which an RF connection is used for communication from the integrated circuit to the security module in the player), it is for example also possible to use an inductive coupling method using for example the well-known MIFARE contactless interface system (standardized in ISO/IEC 14443 for contact-less cards). It is also possible to

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use a capacitive coupling, for example the already mentioned capacitive coupling as described in patent application WO 02/25582 (= PH-NL000525). It is further possible to use for both connections (integrated circuit towards security module and security module to integrated circuit) RF coupling, for example using the so-called Meu chip, developed by Hitachi. The invention is also not limited to a particular kind of storage unit or to a particular kind of OTP memory.

It must further be noted that the term "comprises/comprising" when used in this specification, including the claims, is taken to specify the presence of stated features, integers, steps or components, but does not exclude the presence or addition of one or more other features, integers, steps, components or groups thereof. It must also be noted that the word "a" or "an" preceding an element in a claim does not exclude the presence of a plurality of such elements. Moreover, any reference signs do not limit the scope of the claims; the invention can be implemented by means of both hardware and software, and several "means" may be represented by the same item of hardware. Furthermore, the invention resides in each and every novel feature or combination of features.

EPO - DG 1

CLAIMS:

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- 1. Information carrier comprising an information area for storing information, and an integrated circuit comprising a storage unit for storing additional information ( $A_K$ , Rights), the integrated circuit further comprising a one time programmable memory comprising a resurrection key ( $R_K$ ), the one time programmable memory having a substantially larger data retention time than the storage unit.
- Information carrier according to claim 1, wherein the one time programmable
  memory further comprises information related to the expiration date (D<sub>EXP</sub>) of the
  information stored or to be stored in the information area.
- Information carrier according to claim 1 or 2, wherein the information carrier further comprises a disc key (CID\_key).
- Information carrier according to claim 3, wherein the resurrection key (R<sub>K</sub>) is
   encrypted with the disc key (CID\_key).
  - Information carrier according to claim 3, wherein the expiration date (D<sub>EXP</sub>) is encrypted with the disc key (CID\_key).
- 20 6. Information carrier according to any one of the claims 3 to 4, wherein the disc key (CID\_key) is a unique disc key that is derived from an identifier (ID<sub>UC</sub>) of the integrated circuit.
- Information carrier according to claim 6, wherein the one time programmable
   memory further comprises the identifier (IDUC).
  - Information carrier according to any one of the claims 1 to 7, wherein the one time programmable memory is realized in fuse-logic.

- Information carrier according to any one of the claims 1 to 8., wherein the storage unit is an EEPROM having a data retention time of approximately 10 years.
- 10. Information carrier according to any one of the claims 1 to 9, wherein the
   integrated circuit is contactlessly readable.
  - 11. Method for restoring the additional information (A<sub>K</sub>, Rights) stored in the storage unit present on the integrated circuit of the information carrier of any one of the claim 1 to 10, which method comprises the following steps,
- 10 reading out the additional information stored in the storage unit,
  - checking the integrity of the additional information,

and if the integrity of the additional information is insufficient,

reading out the resurrection key  $(R_K)$  stored in the one time programmable memory and restoring the additional information using the resurrection key.

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- 12. Method according to claims 11, wherein, if the integrity of the additional information is insufficient, the method further comprises the step of checking whether the additional information has degenerated in a natural way, and wherein the step of reading out the resurrection key  $(R_K)$  stored in the one time programmable memory and restoring the additional information using the resurrection key  $(R_K)$  is only performed if the additional information has degenerated in a natural way.
- 13. Method according to claim 11 or 12, wherein the step of the restoring the additional information using the resurrection key is performed by a Trusted Third Party (content provider) or via the Internet over a Secure Authenticated Channel (SAC-9).
- 14. Method according to any one of the claims 11 to 13, wherein the expiration date (D<sub>EXP</sub>) is used in the step of checking whether the additional information has degenerated in a natural way.

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- 15. An apparatus for performing the method according to any one of the claims 11 to 14, comprising a security module comprising
  - means for reading out the additional information  $(A_K$ , Rights) stored in the storage unit,

- means for checking the integrity of the additional information,
- means for reading out the resurrection key  $(R_K)$  stored in the one time programmable memory and restoring the additional information using the resurrection key if the integrity of the additional information is insufficient.

16. An integrated circuit for use in the information carrier according to any one of the claims 1 to 10, the integrated circuit comprising a storage unit for storing additional information ( $A_K$ , Rights), and one time programmable memory comprising a resurrection key ( $R_K$ ).

08.07.2002

ABSTRACT:


EPO - DG 1


09, 07, 2002





The invention relates to an information carrier 1 comprising an information area 2 for storing information, and an integrated circuit 3 comprising a storage unit 4 for storing additional information  $A_K$  and Rights. The integrated circuit further comprises a one time programmable memory 5 comprising a resurrection key  $R_K$ , the one time programmable memory having a substantially larger data retention time than the storage unit. In the case the additional information present in the storage unit is lost or has become degenerated, it is possible to restore this information using the resurrection key present in the one time programmable memory.

10 Fig. 3











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


FIG.7

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